"PREEMPTIVE WAR": IS IT CONSTITUTIONAL?

On March 19, 2003, at 2200 hours (EST), the United States launched a
full-scale military attack against the sovereign state of Iraq. Iraq had neither
attacked the United States, nor was it in the final stages of preparing for such an
assault. Thus, for the first time in the 214-year history of our country, America
had begun a Preemptive War.1
As early as May 2002, President Bush spoke about the use of
"preemption" in a speech he gave at West Point on combating terrorism.2
Subsequently, the administration continued to maintain the position that Iraqi’s
leadership must be eliminated because the Ba’ath regime was continuing the
development of weapons of mass destruction, and might again use those
weapons against an opponent, or supply those weapons to terrorist networks.3
Thus, the Executive Branch claimed the power to attack a sovereign
nation solely on the grounds of fear that that nation might do us harm in the
future.4 Obviously, the President has felt comfortable putting this claim, unique in
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our nation's history, into action. But does our Constitution anticipate such a use
of military force by the federal government?
While there exists a significant body of literature on the respective
allocation of war power between the President and Congress, there literally is not
a single word written in case law or legal literature about whether or not the
federal government (i.e., President and Congress in concert) possesses the
power to wage preemptive war under our Constitution.
In this essay, I argue that the courts should find that the federal
government lacks such a power. Others may disagree. That is fine; it is my
intention to provoke response. None can question, however, that this is a debate
in which the legal academy should engage.
A.

Introduction: The Significant Legal Difference Between Anticipatory
Versus Preemptive War
The Constitution provides the federal government with a number of

interrelated enumerated powers which, when taken together with the “Necessary
and Proper” clause, allow use of military force in a wide range of circumstances.
These include powers to declare war and make appropriations to support the
war, powers to enter into treaties, powers to function as commander in chief of
the military, the powers to conduct foreign relations, and powers to ensure that
the laws (including international law) are “faithfully executed.” Together, these
provide the federal government with flexibility to use force to protect our citizens
and property, our allies, our territory, our commerce, and to use our military as a
member of an international peacekeeping and/or humanitarian force.
plans;" Robert Collier, “Bush’s Evidence of Threat Disputed, Findings Often Ambiguous,
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Our federal government, however, is by design a government of limited
powers.5 As I will show, a broad survey of American political-legal selfunderstanding in the realm of war fairly leads one to conclude that those powers
should not include the right to use military force in support of “preemptive war” or
"preemptive self-defense;”6 by which I mean "us[ing] force to quell any possibility
of future attack by another state, even where there is no reason to believe that an
attack is planned and where no prior attack has occurred.”7 Courts should,
therefore, be prepared to declare a preemptive war, such as our current venture
into Iraq, to be unconstitutional.
Let me put what I'm contending into perspective. Plainly, this nation can
act in “anticipatory” self-defense if the threat to our country is truly imminent.8
Even before the modern world with its long range missiles and terrorists camps
this concept was embodied in the Caroline doctrine of 1842,9 an agreement
between British and American officials that defensive force is permitted when the
Contradict CIA,” THE SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, October 12, 200, at A1.
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”[n]ecessity of that defense is instant, overwhelming and leaving no choice of
means, and no moment for deliberation.”10
Modern circumstances admittedly require a bit more flexibility than
envisioned in the Caroline doctrine. "Anticipatory" self-defense in the modern
world, thus, would include attacking the Japanese fleet steaming toward Pearl
Harbor in WWII provided we had clear and convincing evidence of their intent,11
bombing a terrorist training camp planning attacks on our citizens or soil, going
on the offensive after suffering an initial attack and knowing that further attacks
are coming, attacking when we know that an enemy is preparing to launch
missiles.12
In all these circumstances, the level and certainty of the risk to be endured
before resorting to force fits well within the concept of “imminence” as that
concept is conceived in the classic requirement for the use of deadly force in selfdefense.13 Alternatively, one could designate the tipping point as where there is a
“clear and present danger”14 that the risk will come to fruition. This standard,
10

John B. Moore, 2 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 412 (1906). The Caroline case took place
within the context of the Canadian Rebellion of 1837. In spite of a request by the United States
government that its citizens not get involved, many did, including those bringing arms from New
York to the rebels on the vessel Caroline. The British captured and destroyed the ship; the
problem was that the attack took place in the territorial waters of the United States. Thus, while
the Caroline doctrine has been used as a general standard for when national self-defense is
appropriate, a recent commentator has suggested that the doctrine be limited to its original
historical context; i.e., "extra-territorial use of force by a state in peacetime" within the sovereign
territory of another state "which was unable or unwilling to prevent its territory from being used as
a base of operations for hostile activities against the state taking action." Timothy Kearly, "Raising
The Caroline," 17 W IS. L. J. 325, 325 (1999).
11
See, O’ Connell, supra, n. 6, at 9; Yoram Dinstein, WAR AGGRESSION, AND SELFDEFENSE 172 (3d ed. 2001).
12
O’Connell, supra, n. 6, at 8-10.
13
“[I]mminent danger. The danger resulting from an immediately threatened injury sufficient to
cause a reasonable prudent person to defend himself or herself.” THE HANDBOOK OF
CRIMINAL LAW TERMS 320 (Black’s Law Dictionary Series) (Bryan A. Garner, ed. 2000).
14
See, e.g., Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937).

4

taken from 1st Amendment doctrine involving advocacy of unlawful conduct,
seeks to resolve the tension of granting an extremely serious use of power to the
federal government (barring or punishing speech) in a context where the feared
risk has not yet materialized. Likewise, in the present situation, we are
contemplating an extremely serious use of federal power (armed military force) in
the face of a risk that was only a possible future risk, and not a current reality.
In contrast to justifying the use of force by reference to some notion of
"imminence" defined so as to recognize the realities of the modern world,
Preemptive War is carried out when the situation is neither imminent in any
meaningful sense, nor has reached the point of constituting a clear and present
danger that the feared harm to our citizens and nation will become reality. It is,
thus, this later use of military force which the courts should declare as beyond
the powers possessed by the federal government under our Constitutional
framework, and thereby unconstitutional.
Also, for reasons I will discuss later, a claim that use of military force is
preemptive, and, therefore, unconstitutional, does not face the obstacle which
has consistently blocked litigation concerning use of military force; i.e., the
Political Question Doctrine.
B.

The Federal Government Was Not Given the Constitutional Power to
Conduct Preemptive Self-Defense or Preemptive War
One searches in vain to locate a specific case or textual discussion of the

issue of preemptive war and federal power. In contrast, literature abounds with
debates about whether the President unilaterally may engage in war, or whether
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it is Congress which must declare war,15 with the President left only with the
power necessary to repel a “sudden attack.”16
On the Congressional side of this debate are those emphasizing the need
for broad based popular discussion and support of the war given the human and
economic burdens war brings to its citizens, and the fact that the Constitution
states that Congress is the branch to “Declare War.”17 On the executive side of
this debate are those looking at the law of war as it existed in England prior to the
Revolution,18 and to the fact that over 100 times in our history the executive has
used troops without Congressional consultation.19 In between, are those who
15
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believe that matters involving the use of military use force are properly issues of
negotiation between the political branches,20 or those who believe that absent
Congressional action, the President has free reign in the military arena, but
Congress always may constrain the Executive’s actions.21
All of this is very interesting and important, yet none of this bears on
whether or not the federal government

both executive and legislative branches

together possess the power to engage in preemptive war under our
Constitution. Those few cases reaching the merits of any issue in which the
existence of a state of war is relevant are similarly of no use in this inquiry. They
do not deal with the combined power of the political branches of government to
use military force; rather, they involve statutory and admiralty law regarding
taking and/or selling “prize” ships and their goods.22
The lack of direct textual or case material, however, does not deny a court
the ability to decide this issue. Under our law, circumstantial evidence has equal
force to that which is direct. The weight of circumstantial evidence provides
legitimacy to a claim that the federal government does not have the power under
our Constitution to commit military force to Preemptive War. The circumstantial
evidence falls into five categories: (1) the philosophical underpinnings of our
Constitution’s legitimacy; i.e., John Locke’s Social Contract Theory; (2) the
Founder’s and the “Just War” Doctrine; (3) the Founder’s perspective on War; (4)
20
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MICH. L. E. POL'Y REV. 1, 5 (1997) (veto under WPR unconstitutional under Chada).
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the possible permanent effect on the constitutional structure; and (5) the 214
year’s experience of our nation in employing military force.
1.

Preemptive War or Preemptive Self-Defense is at Odds with the
Rationale Underlying the Social Contract Theory Upon which the
Legitimacy of our Government Rests

“We the people, in order to form a more perfect union . . .” is a direct
expression of the political theory provided in the Social Contract of John Locke.23
While the social contract theory had appeared in writings on political philosophy
for over a hundred years before the formation of this nation, only America took to
heart Locke’s theory to actually structure the government of a new nation.24
The social contract theory postulated that back in the mists of time man
lived in a state of nature where it was “all against all.” In this world, each
individual had “natural rights” revealed by their God-given reason. But each man
was his own law with respect to asserting and protecting these rights, with force
being the final arbiter. In other words, man possessed a great deal of freedom,
but not much security.
To gain security for their lives and property, people were willing to leave
the state of nature, and with it, their previously unappealable right to be the
22

Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37 (1800); Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 1 (1801); Little v.
Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch.) 170 (1804); The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863).
23
J. Locke, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, Second Treatise (C.B. MacPherson, ed.
1980).
24
Doernberg, "‘We The People’: John Locke, Collective Constitutional Rights, And Standing to
Challenge Government Action,” 73 CAL. L. REV. 52-68 (1985); Gardner, “Consent, Legitimacy and
elections: Implementing Popular Sovereignty Under the Lockean Constitution,” 52 PITT. L. REV.
189 (1990). In fairness, it should be noted that some of the Founders espoused the addition of
the philosophy of Civic Republicanism (civic virtue) to Locke’s Social Contract in order to mitigate
what they believed was the excessive individualism of Locke’s theory. See, e.g., Thomas L.
Pangle, "The Spirit of Modern Republicanism--The Moral Visions of the American Founders and
the Philosophy of Locke."
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ultimate law.25 One, thus, gave up the right to make the rules for day-to-day life,
leaving that to a representative body which itself was subject to law. All disputes
then were ultimately decided by the law, not by individual will.
Again, these Lockean related natural law notions directly guided the
construction of our Constitution and our form of government,26 and even played
an explicit part in early Supreme Court decisions.27 After all, those early judges
were there at the creation of this nation. They knew that they had embarked upon
a great and new political experiment in government. It was a nation
simultaneously “of the people, by the people, and for the people.” Time has made
us forget this, or at least caused us to think of only the trees of the constitutional
text and not the underlying forest of political philosophy. Yet the theory of social
contract lies at the very basis of the legitimacy of our government. Our
government was not based on conquest or the Divine Right of Kings. Its
legitimacy was based on the belief (treated as fact) that the citizenry had entered
into a contract.
Each citizen’s security could obviously be threatened by foreign powers.
The Constitution upholds the federal government’s side of the Lockean bargain28
by promising to “[P]rovide for the common defense.” PREAMBLE, UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION. Reviewing the philosophical roots of that bargain, however, it
25

See, Locke, supra, n. 23, at Editor’s Introduction.
See, supra, n. 24.
27
See, e.g., Calder v. Bull, U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 (Cranch.) 87
(1810)); Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch.) 43 (1815).
28
“Security against foreign danger” was “an avowed and essential object of the American Union.”
THE FEDERALIST No. 41, at 304 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cook ed., 1982).
26
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seems unlikely that the “common defense” would include any notion of
“preemptive” defense.
After all, under the social contract theory, one trades the right to be their
own law in return for the assurance that the government will protect them from
the ultimate risk in the state of nature: That another to whom I have threatened
no direct harm, will nonetheless take my “property” (which for Locke includes
both my material goods, my land, and my life). It would be anomalous if the
Founders, who had adopted the social contract theory as the basis for their
government’s legitimacy, would arrogate to that same government the right to do
that very thing to other individuals and nations outside our borders; i.e., attack
when not directly threatened. The only enemies the Founders would have
envisioned would have been European. These also were the countries of the
colonists' ancestry and heritage. The Founders of this fledgling nation could
hardly have even conceptualized such old and culturally rich countries as
England, France, and Spain as suddenly living in, and subject to the rules of, the
state of nature.
The “common defense,” thus, would have meant common self-defense;
defense against actual or imminent attack. Of course the Founders had an
Ocean between themselves and their European enemies. They could never
imagine an object that could be launched across that Ocean and land with such
explosive force that the object could obliterate any city existing in their world.
They never imagined structures the size of a hundred houses stacked on top of
one another, and a flying object crashing into the structure, exploding and
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destroying the entire edifice. But that just changes the factual understanding of
what threat can now be “imminent”. It does not change that an “imminent” threat
is still the standard for the constitutional exercise the power to use military force.
2.

Preemptive War or Preemptive Self-Defense Would Be Antithetical
to the Framer’s Notion of a “Just War

The Founder’s Christian beliefs were inextricably tied into the Social
Contract theory. The limited government conceived at the Constitutional
Convention was in part limited because of the belief that there existed
“inalienable rights” (such as those at the center of the Declaration of
Independence) which could neither be ceded to nor taken by the federal
government.29 These rights were those revealed as “Natural law,” rights30 made
manifest through God-given reason,31 inherent in God’s creation of man.
As persons so fundamentally religious that their political philosophy and
religious conceptions intellectually intertwined, the Founder’s view of war would
have been circumscribed by the “Just War” Doctrine.32 The “Just War” Doctrine
provided norms and criteria for assessing whether a government’s resort to force
was morally justified. The doctrine provided criteria both for judging whether
resort to force was justified (ius ad bellum) and criteria regarding the conduct of
war once combat commenced(ius in bello).33 The ius ad bellum contains six
criteria: (1) just cause; (2) competent authority (3) right intention; (4) last resort
29

See, Wardle, “Reason to Ratify: The Influence of John Locke’s Religious Beliefs on the
Creation and Adoption of the United States Constitution,” 26 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 291, 301.
30
Id., at 304-305; Lawrence H. Tribe, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 560-561 (2 ed.
1988).
31
See, Wardle, supra, n. 29, at 307-308.
32
For a general overview of the Just War, see, “War, Morality of” THE NEW CATHOLIC
ENCYCLOPEDIA, vol. 14, page 635, et seq. (R.A. McCormick, D. Christiansen (2d. ed. 2003).
See also, R. Musto: THE CATHOLIC PEACE TRADITION (1988)).
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(5) probability of success; and (6) proportionality.34 It is hard to imagine how a
truly Preemptive War could ever meet these six criteria.
Admittedly, the 20th and 21st centuries have seen conflicts break out in
permutations different than a war begun by some aggressor nation, such as
Germany in WWII. Adding to the type of traditional war such as the one the
federal government has conducted against Iraq, our world is now plagued with
guerilla warfare, terrorism and counter-terrorist campaigns, and ethnic cleansing.
Yet none of that changes the basic Just War doctrine. “Just Cause” still means
that the “war is permissible only to confront ‘a real national and certain
danger'.…"35 Again, by definition that cannot encompass Preemptive War.
Not surprisingly, given this definition of “just cause”, as well as the
requirement of “last resort,” the United Conference of Catholic Bishops in a
“Statement on Iraq” plainly indicated that war against Iraq would not be a “Just”
one under the Doctrine.36 In fact, in addition to the “just cause” and “last resort”
criteria, the Bishops also questioned both the criteria for “competent authority”
(questioning our country taking such action other than as part of a UN initiative)
and “proportionality” (citing the current suffering of the Iraqi people under the
sanctions, and the likely further suffering in the event of war.)37
3.

Preemptive War is Inconsistent with the Founders Perspective on
War

33

Id., at 637.
Ibid.
35
"The Challenge of Peace: God’s Promise and our Response,” 1983 United State Bishops’
pastoral letter on nuclear war and deterrence.
36
See, "Statement on Iraq,” United States of Catholic Bishops, Washington D.C., 1-2 (Nov. 13,
2002); Bishop Wilton D. Gregory, “Letter to President Bush,” 2 (Sept. 13, 2002).
37
Ibid. See, also, “Consequences of Future Force Against Iraq (address to President Bush and
Secretary of State Rumsfeld), Center for Constitutional Rights (January 24, 2002) (details
humanitarian harm of Iraqi war on Civilian population).
34
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The Founders had just gone through a bloody war on their soil. They had
no interest in making the waging of war by the federal government an easy
exercise.38 Thus, in the Pennsylvania ratifying conference, James Wilson spoke
of the Constitution and war: "The system will not hurry us into war; it is calculated
to guard against it."39 Wars were matters of necessity; something to be avoided if
possible. With this perspective it is hard to imagine that the Founders would have
given the federal government the power to make war on the grounds other than
true “imminent” danger; i.e., traditional self-defense.
Americans did not seek empire and conquest. They had been colonies;
they were not at heart colonialists to the extent of the European powers. They
had gone into battle under a banner displaying a coiled rattlesnake ready to
strike, under which was written, “Don’t tread on Me.” The implication was clear:
Don’t bother us, we won’t bother you. So strong was this inclination in fact that
during the War of 1812 there were serious questions within the federal
government whether it had the power to cross the border into Canada as part of
its nation’s defense.40
38

See, Bickel, “Congress, the President, and the power to Wage War,” 48 CHICAGO-KENT L. REV.
131, 132-133 (1971) (Founders wanted to make it difficult to engage in real war). While
Professors Ely and Yoo, supra, n. 15, hold diametrically opposed views on the locus of power to
initiate war under our Constitution (Ely placing it in the Congress; Yoo in the President), both
agree that one purpose of their chosen structure was to make the initiation of war difficult. Ely is
concerned with a war initiated without the type of widespread political debate and support
engendered by the legislative process. Yoo cites concerns of the Founders that, “Classical history
displayed wild tendencies by pure democracies toward war” and that the popular will might be
“consumed with private interests” in seeking war. Placing substantial control over the war power
by the executive, Yoo, contends, lessened those concerns. See, Yoo, “Continuation of Politics,”
supra, n. 15, at 302.
39
Yoo, “Continuation of Politics,” supra, n. 15, at 190.
40
Abraham D. Sofer, War, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS THE
ORIGINS, 268 (1976).
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As constitutional convention delegate Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut said,
“there is material difference between making war and making peace. It shd. [sic.]
be easier to get out of war than it is to get into it.” Supporting Ellsworth, George
Mason of Virginia added that he “was for clogging rather than facilitating war; but
for facilitating peace.41
Moreover, a significant percentage of the citizenry at that time would not
have wanted to give the federal government any more excuse to raise an army
than necessary. The greatest fear of the Anti-federalist regarding war powers
was that the President, in alliance with or at least unopposed by Congress, would
use a standing army to create a federal dictatorship.42 Allowing preemptive war
would have given the executive a rationale for constantly maintaining an army.
The new American citizens had just fought and died to expel just such a
government in the form of the Crown and its troops. They were not about to fall
under the heels of the same form of government, with the title “President”
substituted for “King."
41

Yoo, “Continuation of Politics,” supra, n. 15, at 263. In fact, the new nation possessed neither
economic nor military resources to wage war (at the time Washington assumed the presidency,
there were fewer than 840 men in the U.S. Army, and there were no naval forces to command).
See, Jules Lobel, "Foreign Affairs and the Constitution: The Transformation of the Original
Understanding," in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 274-75 (1990) (revised ed.).
As Attorney General Randolph wrote to James Monroe in 1775:
Foreign policy was a major concern underlying the convocation of the
Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia. Various state governments were
violating international law and treaty agreements, provoking retaliatory actions by
European powers. Randolph opened the main business of the convention by
listing the defects of the Articles of Confederation, the first of which included 'that
they could not cause infractions to treaties or of the law of nations to be
punished.' Madison echoed this theme, asking whether the proposed
constitutional plan will 'prevent those violations of the law of nations and treaties
which if not prevented must involve us in the calamities of war.'
Letter From Randolph to James Monroe (June 1, 1795) cited in Lobel, "The Rise and Decline of
the Neutrality Act: Sovereignty and Congressional War Powers in United States Foreign Policy,"
24 HARV. INT'L LAW J. 1, 21 (1983); see, also, F. Wharton, A Digest of International Law of the
United States, 2d ed. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1887), 3: 514.
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4.

Permitting Preemptive War Risks Permanent Alteration of the Basic
Constitutional Structure

The federal government faces the limits of its powers when its actions
threaten a permanent alteration of the basic constitutional structure. Thus, recent
Tenth Amendment Supreme Court jurisprudence retains sensitivity to the
concern that excessive federal encroachment into matters affecting the states
risks erosion of state sovereignty, and with it, the basic federalist constitutional
structure. See, e.g., Lopez v. United States.43 Underlying this stance is a more
general notion, a notion embedded in logic. You cannot legitimately exercise a
power given with the purpose of supporting an entity when that power is being
employed in a manner which destroys that very entity.
The same concern inures in the misuse of federal military power. At the
extreme, the federal government hardly could constitutionally use its power to
use military force if that force was employed to seize control of all state
governments when there was no insurrection. While permitting preemptory war
does not raise this extreme scenario, it carries the risk of a serious undermining
of the constitutional structure, and it is a risk to our federal republic that is far
greater than that posed by any foreseeable misuse of the Commerce Clause.
For this harm to our constitutional structure to emerge would only require
something like the following scenario: Claiming the right to conduct preemptive
war, the federal government carries out a series of seemingly unending military
42

Id., at 272-273.
514 U.S. 549 (1995) (congressional act barring possession of firearms in "school zones"
beyond power of Congress). See, also, United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (Violence
Against Women Act beyond congressional power under Commerce Clause).
43
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actions: from Afghanistan to Iraq; Iraq to Syria; Syria to Iran; Iran to Somalia;
Somalia to North Korea; North Korea to [fill in the blank]. Once preemptive selfdefense is accepted as legitimate, what may have previously been unthinkable,
now becomes relatively simple (especially with a compliant visual media which
seems to find "war as a sporting event," or "war as a video game," good for
ratings.)
How can this be? Again, it's simple. Relying upon the rationale of
preemptive self-defense, particularly when conjoined with the recent belief in
state sponsored terrorism, our country can justify attacking any other nation. In
this post-9/11 world, it is litany that a handful of terrorists armed with so-called
weapons of mass destruction could cause significant harm and inflict large-scale
casualties on an otherwise powerful country. Therefore, e.g., employing the
preemptive defense rationale, Russia could justify attacking Monaco on the claim
that a group of croupiers at the casino had planned to provide a few vials of
some deadly virus to the Chechnyan rebels.
So, now imagine our scenario has proceeded to where our country is
embroiled in a series of wars. In this constant state of war, our society's almost
exclusive focus becomes the current war. Federal funds and priorities become
focused on all things military. But, because any attack on a nation in the twentyfirst century carries the threat of terrorist reprisals, states must be enlisted in antiterrorism security. This, however, will tend to drain state coffers, leaving
insufficient funding for such traditional state functions as education and crime
control. At the same time, the constant danger of enemy attack can be used to
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justify broad security-directed legislation like the Patriot Act, increased pressure
on civil liberties,44 and an ever mounting presence of the federal government in
our private lives. The result is a dominating federal government in which the
states and the citizens principally exist to endlessly support the federal militaryindustrial

complex,

preemptive

war

to

preemptive

war.

Under

these

circumstances, the federalist conception reflected in the constitutional structure
of our government would exist only in the most diluted form, as that structure
undergoes de facto alteration.
5.

In the Two-Hundred and Fourteen Year History of this Nation, Prior
to Our Attack on Iraq, There Was Not a Single Instance When We
Engaged in Preemptive War

The United States has sent troops into other sovereign nations well over
100 times.45 Admittedly, history suggests that some of the official rationales were
perhaps ingenuous, with the military action at least in part being motivated by,
e.g., a desire to annex land on the North American continent.46 Yet even these
never amounted to anything akin to preemptive self-defense:
44

Recent experience has unfortunately made this risk palpable. See, e.g., Lawyers Committee for
Human Rights, "Imbalance of Powers: How Changes to U.S. Law and Policy Since 9/11 Erode
Human Rights & Civil Liberties" (2003) (six month update of original report) (publication details:
widespread post-9/11 enhancement of governmental powers to spy on U.S. citizens and to gather
information about U.S. citizens; legislation limiting citizens' access to information about the
federal government; indefinite incarceration of U.S. citizens; expanded power to search libraries,
bookstores, and the internet; proposals that would permit extradition of U.S. citizens for trial in
foreign countries with which we have no extradition treaties; proposals that would permit loss of
U.S. citizenship as punishment for certain acts; and lessening constraints on foreign intelligence
services to conduct domestic surveillance).
45
See, supra, n. 19.
46
Both the incursions into Spanish–controlled Florida in the early 1800s and the Mexican War in
1846 smack of the aggrandizement of territory. Yet neither was based on any claim of a right to
conduct a Preemptive War. Florida combined instability in a territory we were in the process of
negotiating to purchase, the request of a revolutionary government for our aid, and the reality that
British troops would be stationed at the Southern border of the new nation, filling the vacuum
resulting from the collapse of the Spanish Empire. See, Sofaer, supra, n. 40, at 294-326. The
Mexican War involved our claim of a lawful right to disputed territory, which now constitutes much
of Texas. President Polk sent troops to claim all land north of the Rio Grande. When the Mexican
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The historical record indicates that the United States has
never, to date, engaged in a ‘preemptive’ military attack against
another nation.47
Throughout our over 200 year history as a nation, use of force has been
grounded in a variety of rationales. Some have involved the use of force to
protect U.S. citizens and property.48 Some involved circumstances where the
local governments allegedly could no longer maintain order,49 including some
where treaty rights50 supplemented this nation’s right to intervene. We have even
employed troops in a failed attempt to rescue American citizens held hostage. 51
Some incursions were based on the Monroe Doctrine; sending troops to
states in our hemisphere whose instability made them incapable of keeping
“foreign powers” out of the Western Hemisphere. 52 Force has also been used to
government understandably objected and crossed the Rio Grande, America considered itself
"attacked on its soil,” and, thus, responded in self-defense of its territory and people. See,
Grimmett, supra, n. 1, at CRS-1; Ratner, supra, n. 15, at 468; note, "Future Combat," supra, n.
15, at 1780.
47
See, Grimmett, supra, n. 1, at CRS-1 to CRS-2.
48
Troops have been deployed to protect citizens in Haiti (intermittently: 1915-1934); Dominican
Republic (intermittently: 1916-1924; 1965); the Boxer Rebellion(1900) (though in the process
were violated international law by taking reprisals against the rebel. See, O’Connell, supra, n. 2,
at 6) Nicaragua (1912); Panama (1903, 1989); Grenada (1983) (also at request of neighboring
islands when a Marxist faction overthrew the existing government); (Formosa 1955); Lebanon
(1957). See, gen., Ratner, supra, n. 15, at 468-470; Note, “Future Combat,” supra, n. 15, at 17881793.
49
Ibid.
50
Intrusions into Haiti and the Dominican Republic in the early portion of the 20th century were in
part justified by treaties which in effect made those nations U.S. protectorates. Treaties involving
Panama and the Canal were used as part of the justification for our intervention in 1903.
Similarly, President Eisenhower’s decision to send marines to the Dominican Republic in 1965
was based on O.A.S. obligations. See, Grimmett, supra, n. 1, at CRS-2 TO CRS-3; Note, “Future
Combat”, supra, n. 15, at 1792-1793.
51
See Yoo, “Continuation of Politics,” supra, n. 15, at 8 (troops sent in unsuccessful attempt to
rescue Iranian hostages in 1980).
52
See, Sofaer, supra, n.40, at 255; Grimmett, supra, n.1, at CRS-2 to CRS-3.
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respond to a foreign state which sponsored terrorism that resulted in the death of
American citizens in Europe. 53
Military force has been employed to restore governments to power in our
own hemisphere,54 and at other times has been used in conjunction with a treaty
obligation to ensure the “neutrality” of the Isthmus of Panama.55 We have also
used our troops to preserve the status quo while negotiating for the annex of
foreign held territory on our continent,56 and have dispatched troops to pursue
pirates, bandits, and outlaws.57
We have protected our military personnel, such as in the Pueblo58 and
Marquez59 incidents, and when our troops have been fired upon when providing
military aid to neighboring nations.60 We have fought wars against nations who
continued to prey on our shipping and commerce,61 against nations that invaded
“disputed territory” we claimed to have annexed, against a nation that attacked
our Naval bases (Pearl Harbor), against a nation intertwined with terrorists who
attacked on our soil (9/11), and against a nation which refused to leave its
53

See, Henkin, supra, n. 15, at 99; Hon R. Torricelli, “War Powers Resolution After the Libya
Crisis,” 7 PACE L. REV. 661 (1987).
54
See, Henkin, supra, n.15, at 101 (troops to Haiti in 1994).
55
See, Note, “Future Combat," supra, n. 15, at 1789 (intervention in Panama against Columbia in
1903 based on 1846 treaty).
56
See, discussion of intrusions into Spanish held Florida, supra, n. 44.
57
We have chased Pancho Villa into Mexico, the Seminoles into Florida, and Noriega into
Panama. See, Berger, supra, n. 15, at 59-60; Note, “Future Combat,” supra, n. 15, at 1789.
58
See, Note, “Future Comba,t” supra, n. 15, at 1781 (military response to North Korean attack on
U.S. Naval ship, the Pueblo.
59
See, Yoo, “Continuation of Politics,” supra, n. 15, at 181 (military response to Cambodian
attack on Mayaquez in 1975).
60
Note, “War Powers Resolution,” supra, n. 19, at 1422 (troops providing military aid at request of
El Salvador fired upon; 1984).
61
For example, war against the Tripoli Pirates (1802) and Algiers (1815); Undeclared war against
France (“Adam’s War, 1798-1800); War of 1812; WWI (1914). See, Ratner, supra, n. 15, at 465466; Note, “Future Combat,” supra, n. 15, at 1785-1786.
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Caribbean colony, declared war against us, and arguably sank one of our battle
ships. (“Remember the Maine”).62
Most of our use of force in the latter 20th Century, however, has been
pursuant to some combination of regional and bilateral defense pacts (NATO,
SEATO), treaty obligations, and UN membership.63 In addition to justifying force
against aggressors, these commitments also have provided the basis for
providing troops for peacekeeping and humanitarian purposes.64
Only the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962)65 even hinted at the use of
preemptive force. Yet that incident hardly stands as a precedent. In the first
place, reasonable people could have characterized the risk to our citizens and
soil as “imminent.” After all, our deadly enemy, the “Evil Empire”, whose leader
had told ours that “We will bury you,” had surreptitiously brought nuclear missiles
to an island ally of theirs, located a boat ride from our shore. Advisors from that
“Cold War” enemy nation were helping set up and man the missile batteries and
these missiles would soon be, if not already, pointing at us. In the second place,
62

The Spanish-American War is somewhat complex in its origins. We ordered Spain to leave
Cuba; they declared war on U.S.; we declared war on them; the Maine blew up and sunk. See,
Grimmett, supra, n 1, at CRS-2; Ratner, supra, n 15, at 470.
63
The Korean War (1950) was justified by our commitments to the UN charter; Viet Nam was
justified by the SEATO mutual defense pact and the 1954 Geneva Accord which divided North
and South Korea; the 1991 Iraqi War by a UN Resolution following Iraq’s Invasion of Kuwait. See,
Office of the legal advisor, U.S. Department of State, “The legality of United States Participation
in Viet Nam,” 75 YALE L. J. 1085 (1966); Note, “Future Combat,” supra, n. 15, at 1791-1792;
Stramseth, ”Collective Force and Constitutional Responsibility: War Powers in the post-Cold War
Era,” 50 MIAMI L. REV. 145 (1995). This has prompted some authors to question whether UN
Resolutions and Treaties can supplant Congress’s role in declaring war, see, Van Alstine,
“Congress, the President, and the Power to Declare War: A Requiem to Viet Nam,” 121 U. PAL.
REV. 1, 15 (1972); and whether treaties can trump constitutional protections, Bishop, Jr.,
“Unconstitutional Treaties,“ 42 MINN. L. REV. 773 (1958).
64
Ibid. Sending troops into Lebanon (1982) (secular violence continues after Israeli invasion),
Kosovo (1984), and Somalia (1993), all were part of UN or NATO peacekeeping and
humanitarian missions.
65
See, Grimmett, supra, n. 1, at CRS-2; Yoo, “Applying the War powers Resolution To the War
on Terrorism,” 6 GREEN BAG 2D 175, 179 (2003).
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and most importantly, we did not attack Cuba. The combination of a naval
blockade and tense negotiations led to removal of the missiles.
It is far more than mere coincidence that in 214 years our nation has never
even attempted to resort to rationalizing our use of force under the label of
“Preemptive” defense. It is far more than mere coincidence that such a rationale
arguably would violate International Law.66 Rather, any notion of attempting to
legitimate the rationale of preemptive war should strike one as deeply terrifying if
one takes but a moment to think of its implications for any possibility of a world at
peace.
If America creates a precedent through its practice, that
precedent will be available, like a loaded gun, for other states to
use as well. The preemptive use of military force would establish a
precedent that the United States has worked against since 1945.
Preemptive self-defense would provide legal justification for
Pakistan to attack India, for Iran to attack Iraq, for Russia to attack
Georgia, for Azerbaijan to attack Armenia, for North Korea to attack
South Korea, and so on. Any state that believes another regime
poses a possible future threat—regardless of the evidence—could
cite the United States invasion of Iraq.67
It is fair to infer that our Founders were far too bright to place us at such risk.
C.

The Issue of Whether the Constitution Denies the Federal Government the
Power to Employ Preemptive Military Force is Justiciable
1.

The Issue of the Limits of the Federal Government to Employ
Military Force is a Legal One

In presenting a court with the issue of whether the federal government
possesses the constitutional power to conduct preemptive war, one would be
66

O’Connell, supra, n. 6, at 2-3, 21. See, also, Jennie Green, Barbara Olshansky, Michael
Ratner, AGAINST WAR WITH IRAQ: AN ANTI-WAR PRIMER, (Open Media Pamphlet Series,
2003); Richard Falk, "Why International Law Matters: Pre-emptive War Flagrantly Contradicts the
UN's Legal Framework," THE NATION, vol. 276, issue 9 (3/10/03). But see, rationale put forth in

21

asking that court to decide an issue square within the province of our judicial
branch of government: Given our constitutional framework in which the federal
government is one of limited, enumerated powers,68 is the power to use force in a
Preemptive War one which the federal government has been given? This issue is
no different than deciding the limits of the power of the federal government to act
under the Commerce clause when those actions interfere with the affairs of the
States under our system of Federalism. See, e.g., Lopez v. United Sates,
supra.69
This is the classic stuff of Marbury v. Madison:70 “It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” The political
question doctrine of Baker v. Carr, 71 thus, has absolutely no applicationto this
issue.
2.

The Political Question Doctrine Has No Application To This Case

Courts have tended to almost reflexively associate the political question
doctrine with any litigation attempting to enjoin the use of military force.72 The
arguments by now are familiar. There is a textual commitment in the Constitution
Jason Burke & Ed Vulliamy; “War Clouds Gather as Hawks Lay Their Plans,” OBSERVER 14 (July
14, 2002).
67
O’Connell, supra, n. 6, at 19 (fn. omitted).
68
See, supra, n. 5.
69
514 U.S. 549
70
5 U.S. 1 (Cranch.) 137, 177 (1803).
71
369 U.S. 186 (1962).
72
See, e.g., Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F. 1307, 1309 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S.
936 (1973); Lowery v. Regan, 676 F. Supp. 333 (D.D.C. 1987); Ange v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 509
(D.D.C 1970). But see, Mora v. McNamara, 389 U.S. 934 (1967) (Justices Stewart and Douglass
dissenting from denial of certiorari in case addressing constitutionality of Viet Nam War). On the
other hand, there have been courts which found the issue of declaring war justiciable under the
political question doctrine, denying the case on other grounds. See, e.g., Oralndo v. Larid, 434
F.2d 1039, 1042 (2d Cir. 1971) (court finds evidence of “sufficient action” by Congress to
authorize the war); Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141, 1150-1151 (D.D.C. 1990) (case asking
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to the two political branches of government;73 it is for Congress and the executive
to negotiate how they will handle events of military force or war, and the Court
should not interfere;74 the relationship between war, and foreign affairs, and
political negotiations are complex, nuanced and beyond the understanding of the
judiciary whose uninformed interference could jeopardized national interests;75
courts lack the competence, information gathering capacity, or meaningful
standards to assess such basically political issues76 (such as whether the
President’s dispatch of troops constitutes “hostilities” under the War Powers
Resolution);77 Congress can resort to "self-help" to check Presidential powers;78
the Founders considered disputes between the President and Congress as not
constituting “cases” or “controversies”.79
court to find 1991 Iraqi war unconstitutional because Congress did not declare war; justiciable
under political question doctrine, but not “ripe”).
73
See, Broughton, supra, n. 20, at 691 Berk v. Laird, 317 F. Supp. 715, 729 (ED NY 1970).
74
See, Broughton, supra, n. 20, at 691.
75
See, Orlando v. Laird, supra, 434 F.2d 1043 (It [inappropriate judicial inquiry] would indeed,
destroy the flexibility of action which the executive and legislative must have in dealing with other
sovereigns).
76
See, Broughton, supra, n. 20, at 691.
77
See, Crockett v. Regan, 558 F. Supp. 893, 898-899 (D.D.C. 1982). See, also, Ratner, supra, n.
15, at 482.
78
See, Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 25 (D.C, Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 815 (2000)
(Silberman J, concurring). Justice Silberman also wrote that there exist no principled judicial
standards for defining “war” for purposes of constitutional interpretation. Id., at 24-25. Even if
Justice Silberman is correct (and his fellow jurist Tate disagreed with him, Id., at 40), that would
have no bearing on the present case. Whatever label one puts on the proposed use of
preemptive military force against Iraq, that particular use of force is constitutionally beyond the
power possessed by the federal government.
79
See, Yoo, “Continuation of Politics,” supra, n. 15, at 288 (Founders did consider disputes
between legislative and executive branches “cases or controversies”). But see, Dellum v. Bush,
supra, 752 F. Supp. 1141 (court in principle willing to consider dispute between Congress and
President, but case not ripe.). In present case, the dispute is between a private citizen and the
federal government.
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While some have forcefully argued that issues involving commitment of
U.S. troops can and in fact must be considered by the courts,80 we need not
consider these arguments here. For in this case, none of the rationales for which
courts have employed the political question doctrine to abstain from deciding the
merits of questions concerning war have any applications whatsoever.
It does not matter whether the President or Congress has initiated this
action,81 or the meaning of “Declare” war in the Constitution82 or whether the war
can take place without such a declaration,83 or if there has been “sufficient”
evidence of Congressional involvement with the President in the decision,84 or
the significance of the War Powers Act and whether “hostilities” have taken place
so as to trigger the Act,85 or if Congress has alternative means of “self-help”
within their own legislative province and therefore do not need to involve the
Judicial power.86 The position I'm putting forth posits that federal government
does not have the power to wage Preemptive War, even if both political branches
agree and Congress files a Declaration of War.
80

See, Doe v. Bush, (U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit: #03-1266). BRIEF SUBMITTED
ON BEHALF OF 74 CONCERNED LAW PROFESSORS AS AMICUS CURIAE SUPPORTING
THE REQUEST OF APPELLANTS FOR REVERAL, at 15-21 [hereinafter “Brief”]. See, also,
Thomas M. Franck, POLITICAL QUESTIONS/JUDICIAL ANSWERS: DOES THE RULE OF LAW
APPLY TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS? (1992) (author posits that Court should apply same
constitutional analysis in foreign affairs that it applies to domestic concerns).
81
See, supra, ns. 15, 18.
82
Ibid.
83
Ibid.
84
See, Campbell v. Clinton, supra, 203 F.3d, at 25. Note, that it also does not matter whether
Congress delegated the power to attack Iraq in the “October Resolution,” H.J. Res. 114 (107th
Cong, 2d Sess, 2001), and if they did, whether that delegation would be constitutional, “Brief,”
supra, n. 80, at 13-16. Congress can not delegate a power which the federal government does
not possess.
85
See, Orlando v. Laird, supra, 443 F.2d 1042.
86
See, Broughton, supra, n. 20, at 717.
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Likewise, traditional political questions arguments concerning the textual
commitment of war to the political branches, the theory that structurally the
Founders intended the Legislative and the Executive branches to provide
systematic checks on the power of war (the Congress through controlling funding
and impeachment; the President through use of veto power),87 the notion that
Congress and the President must be left free to negotiate over their relative roles
in war, and the idea that courts have no competency to interfere with this most
extreme tool of foreign relations and diplomacy similarly have no purchase here.
There is no interest in helping the federal government pursue a power under the
circumstances when the court determines that the federal government does not
possess such a power. This then, is the very type of decision for which the
judicial branch is uniquely competent; determining when the federal government
has acted beyond its limited powers.88
87

See, Yoo, "Continuation of Politics," supra, n. 15, at 3.
In the Iraqi situation, there was no question that the war was preemptive; but what if the matter
was in dispute, with litigants claiming the use of force preemptive, and the government
characterizing the use of force as anticipatory?
Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19 (1827), superficially appears to speak to these issues. In
that case, the Court refused to question the judgment of the President whether "sufficient danger
of invasion" existed to justify calling up the militia under a federal statute. The decision makes
complete sense. The President must be able to respond quickly to the threat of invasion; and the
Judiciary is in a poor position to second-guess him on the question of just assembling troops. But,
in Mott, the Court was asked to decide whether the threat of invasion was in fact imminent. That,
however, is a judgment for the Commander-in-Chief and the military. It is to the executive that the
Constitution has committed the prosecution of war, and it is the President and military hierarchy
that, as a practical matter, possess the requisite information and expertise to make that
determination. The Court lacks this competence.
Here, however, the present issue and Mott part company. As a power granted under statute,
the Mott Court found that the predicate factual findings made by the President to exercise that
power were beyond review. Id., at 30. But here we have an issue involving the very existence of a
constitutional power. Whether the federal government's actions in committing troops falls on the
constitutional or unconstitutional side of the line cannot be left to the ipse dixit of that same
government.
What then is the Court to decide? This and only this: whether, based on the evidence the
government provides (and not just their say-so), the Court finds that a "reasonable person" could
find imminence and/or clear and present danger. In other words, the Court must find something
88
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D.

Conclusion
A review of the philosophy underlying the Constitution, the "just war"

doctrine, the Founders' view on the role of war, the possible permanent effect on
the constitutional structure, and the 214-year experience in using military force,
make plain that the employment of Preemptive Self-Defense or Preemptive War
are beyond the power given the federal government. We have, nevertheless,
attacked Iraq and, with that action, lost another piece of what (if any) is left of our
national innocence. Yet, use of military force against Iraq, which I have
contended should be viewed as unconstitutional, must not now be seen as a
legal precedent, next used to justify some similar incursions into Iran, North
Korea, or who knows where else.

Next time the courts should act in this

completely justiciable arena; next time they should define the Constitutional limits
of the federal power to employ military force.

akin to the "reasonable fact finder" standard of FRE 104(b); i.e., sufficient evidence that a
reasonable fact finder "could" find the factual proposition in issue. That is a legal decision, not a
political one.
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